A bit of catching up:
It's been some time since the last post -- and while I've been quiet, I've not been idle.
In working with Muslim and/or Middle Eastern related issues and organizations over the past two years, I've observed and experienced what works, what doesn't, what still must be done. I've been seeing media strategy successes and failures from other sectors as well, since lessons can be learned (though not rotely copied) from anywhere.
I've increasingly drawn on the principles and techniques from the crisis communications end of the public and media relations sphere. That it fits so well for this sector is indicative of many things: most Muslim advocacy organizations are still reactive instead of proactive; that the Muslim community still faces unfamiliarity, distrust and a host of professional antagonists; and that conventional PR outreach --even conventional crisis management thinking -- is not always enough.
This last point is proving to be important. I see more and more companies and institutions across the board -- regardless of sector or industry --that are structurally and culturally unable to implement a good crisis communications plan, even if they had one. I'll delve into this in upcoming posts.
It's been a productive period away. Now, it's time to share some ideas and perspective developed in the interim. Consider this Muslim Comm 3.0, though there's info here for every business person or communications director, regardless of sector.
Let's dig in.
One area that seems to be glossed over to varying degrees in crisis communications (though much less so in the private corporate sector) is in fully analysing your opponent's specific attack message. As a PR person or communications director, you'll put a lot of thought and effort into a response -- your output -- but are you able to fully evaluate the input that you're responding to?
High stakes corporations and/or their crisis strategy consultants will often hire private investigators to research the opposition. Investigators ferret out the opponent's true agenda or goals, underlying motivation and any vulnerabilities. Investigative targets can be specific, such as a rival company or CEO, or more general,such as understanding the psychology behind the demographics that are opposed to your position.
Sometimes, of course, it backfires, as in the
ethically-challenged case of Walmart last June when a staff member of a PR firm Walmart had retained posed as a reporter.
That incident's takeaway: it's a fine line between researching your opposition and industrial espionage, but if you have to cross it, hire professionals. PR firms shouldn't "go there" in house, largely because a professional private investigator could have likely gotten relevant info through less surreptitious means. That said, if they have to be fuzzy, they're not as likely to get caught: if it's happening and it's not known, then of course it's being done well.
If you believe the firm's version that the staffer was independent, then PR firms need to better vet and train who they hire.
While the Muslim community at large has done work examining the Islamophobe class -- most notably last year's
report by the Center for American Progress, "Fear, Inc: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America" -- I'm not aware of any high intensity private investigative work that rivals what can happen in the political or corporate arenas. But for this sector, that's how it should be -- it's an obviously ill-advised approach for Muslim groups, who must remain extremely transparent and above board in the current climate.
(As a brief aside, see my review of that report and my interview with principal author Wajahat Ali over at Muslim Matters.org).
But a lot of rigorous due diligence and investigation can be done openly and transparently. Are you doing your homework? You can be sure that your opposition is.
It's clear that Muslim opposition remains consistently focused and proactive. After 11 years, Muslim groups are still caught unaware, perpetually on the defensive, and have yet to assemble a sustained, effective media message and presence. It's possible --myself and others have written directly on this topic for years.
So how is your research information used? Advocacy or position organizations, as well as corporations with intense rivals and competition or that are in a controversial sector (pharmaceuticals), use this information in their crisis plan as a foundation to build templated pre-responses in the event of an emergency or crisis when the opposition strikes. A more aggressive approach is to integrate the gathered intelligence in an ongoing proactive media offensive.
By contrast, most Muslim groups -- and even many businesses -- may not have such resources, much less have such info integrated into a strategic media or crisis communications plan.
That level of prep -- even if you have it --may not be enough in the heat of a media war. Your research will provide insight on your opponent's motivations, psychology and goals, but such data will likely be broad, strategic. But when your opposition strikes with an ad, a blog post or a viral video, you'll need to drill down a little deeper and examine their media at a more granular level.
In a media battle, content is not merely content. It becomes a weapon with a specific tactical function. As communications strategists in a volatile sector, you need the skill set to analyze and disable those weapons aimed at your organization or its interests.
