The first one is an extremely insightful analysis on Turkey's current foreign policy options, and why the U.S. should pay heed to how they play it. Great piece. Wish I could contribute to his discussion, but there's really nothing I can add -- he's covered it all and very astutely... friends, go read it.
And this one too: a week earlier, he also posted his take on (and a brief summary of) "Obama's Muslim Strategy 2.0" over at Religion Dispatches.
The piece gives the breakdown of key points presented at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy’s 11th Annual Conference, "US Relations with the Muslim World: One Year After Cairo," held April 28th, and outlines Obama's strategy of building Muslim transnational networks.
Haroon's take on it seems to be one of caution: "...it could backfire," he writes. "The last time we helped develop a network of Muslims who came together for common cause, it got messy; al Qaeda emerged from the bloody aftermath."
His final remarks also spell out the stakes and obstacles ahead:
Growing in size and sophistication, these networks will no doubt bump up against the policies and practices of American allied-authoritarian states and will expose Obama’s Achilles Heel: the tension between state religion and religion defined by individuals, communities and institutions. What happens when non-state networks bang their heads against the statist ceilings above them? Who, in that contest, will we choose? Will we make like Dick Cheney and shoot our friends in the face?I'm probably even less optimistic than Haroon is, though I believe in the endeavour. The problem as I see it (based on info from the article) is twofold. One, it's not clear what Obama's ultimate end game is: to build Islamic networks to counteract radical elements is, as Haroon correctly points out, "either admirably sophisticated or worryingly imperialist. How Muslims, as participants and spectators, perceive the strategy is undeniably crucial to its success."
We can work with the governments of the few or work responsibly and prudently towards enabling governments of the many. There is as yet not enough evidence of this; the network-building proceeds apace, but often avoids facing up to difficult political questions. If he does not insist on the importance of responsible government, checks and balances and transparency, most of all among our allies in the Muslim-majority world, Obama would only confirm many Muslims’ deepest anxieties: that he was a false hope.
To that end, I'd add from his last paragraph quoted above that the greatest transparency and checks and balances needs to be most of all from the Obama administration itself as it pursues this path, more so than nations or groups we woo to the network. The U.S. needs to lead by example on these virtues; anything less runs a high risk of being perceived as an American cyberpuppet state.
My second concern is more of an open musing, than a concrete concern: Just how realistic is this plan? My perception of the ummah is that it's beautifully diverse at its best and fractiously divisive at its worst. There seems to be a lot more range of thought than even the ummah itself wants to admit at times. Certainly there is a solid unity under the *spiritual* umbrella of Islam, but the U.S. -- predicated in large part on separation of church and state -- can't take the faith element as too much of a unifying factor,lest it be perceived as building a cybertheocracy, either by non-Muslim interested parties watching the process or by Muslim participants who feel America is ratcheting up imperialism even higher by co-opting faith. That leaves Obama with the challenge to build cohesion from a geopolitical Islam or sociocultural Islam (I know those are contradictions in terms in an absolute sense, but you know where I'm going) -- a sensitive task, simultaneously epic and delicate, given the diversity across the ummah.
Thanks to Haroon for these two articles; his work always makes me think. He really should be the next Secretary of State.
No comments:
Post a Comment